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THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS 
Faced  w i t h  c o m p l a i n t s  f rom b u s i n e s s e s ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  a n d  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  about t h e  a f f o r d a b i l i t y  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  of l i a b i l i t y  
insurance ,  Congress appears  l i k e l y  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i s s u e .  What a  decade 
ago was seen a s  p r i m a r i l y  a  products  l i a b i l i t y  insurance  c r i s i s  i s  now 
viewed a s  a f f e c t i n g  a  wide range of those  who need insurance  a g a i n s t  t o r t  
l i a b i l i t y .  Without a f f o r d a b l e  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e ,  t h e  t h r e a t  of  l a w s u i t s  
can make i t  imposs ib le  f o r  bus inesses  and p r o f e s s i o n a l s  t o  d e l i v e r  t h e i r  
p roduc t s  and s e r v i c e s .  
Both economic and l e g a l  f a c t o r s  a r e  being c i t e d  a s  causes  of t h e  
c r i s i s .  Economic f a c t o r s  inc lude  insurance  market c y c l e s ,  u n d e r w r i t i n g  
p r a c t i c e s ,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e insurance  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Legal f a c t o r s  
i n c l u d e  t h e  a l l e g e d  l i t i g a t i o n  exp los ion  and t h e  McCarran-Ferguson A c t ' s  
exemption of t h e  b u s i n e s s  of insurance  from most Federa l  r e g u l a t i o n .  
I n s u r e r s  c l a im an i n a b i l i t y  t o  p r i c e  premiums e f f e c t i v e l y  because 
they  cannot  e v a l u a t e  r i s k .  This  i n a b i l i t y ,  they c la im,  r e s u l t s  from a  
l i t i g a t i o n  exp los ion ,  inc lud ing  excess ive  damage awards i n  t o r t  s u i t s  and 
c o u r t  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  have expanded t h e  c i rcumstances  i n  which damages may 
be awarded. The l i t i g a t i o n  exp los ion ,  they  contend,  has  made r e a l i s t i c  
underwr i t ing  ( r i s k  assessment and p r i c i n g )  f o r  commercial l i a b i l i t y  r i s k s  
problemat ic .  To remedy t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  they  have urged Congress and t h e  
S t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  t o  enac t  v a r i o u s  t o r t  reforms.  
T r i a l  lawyers and consumer groups,  by c o n t r a s t ,  d i s p u t e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
of a  l i t i g a t i o n  exp los ion ,  and p l a c e  t h e  blame f o r  t h e  insurance  c r i s i s  on 
t h e  i n s u r e r s  themselves.  They argue t h a t ,  i n  t h e  r e c e n t  y e a r s  p reced ing  
t h e  p r e s e n t  c r i s i s ,  p roper ty -casua l ty  companies p r i ced  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s  f a r  
below c o s t  t o  a t t r a c t  funds f o r  investment.  Then-prevai l ing h i g h  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  on inves tments  compensated f o r  i n s u f f i c i e n t  premiums. Now t h a t  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  have dropped t o  t h e  p o i n t  where inves tment  r e t u r n s  a r e  no t  
a b l e  t o  cover  growing underwri t ing l o s s e s ,  i n d u s t r y  c r i t i c s  a r g u e ,  
i n s u r e r s  a r e  a t t empt ing  w i t h  unreasonable  r a t e  i n c r e a s e s  t o  recoup l o s s e s  
t o o  qu ick ly .  I n d u s t r y  c r i t i c s  have a l s o  c a l l e d  f o r  r e p e a l  o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n  
of t h e  McCarran-Ferguson Act i n  o r d e r  t o  permit  an inc reased  Federa l  r o l e  
i n  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o r  o v e r s i g h t  of t h e  i n d u s t r y .  Insurance  community 
spokesmen, however, whi le  f avor ing  t o r t  reform, a r e  wary of  r e g u l a t o r y  
o v e r r e a c t i o n  t h a t  w i l l  i n j u r e  t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  of a  h i s t o r i c a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l  
i n d u s t r y  i n  responding t o  market cond i t ions .  
ISSUE DEFINITION 
A wide r a n g e  of b u s i n e s s e s ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  h a v e  
u rged  Congress  t o  t a k e  a c t i o n  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  c r i s i s  i n  t h e  a f f o r d a b i l i t y  
and a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e .  Without  a f f o r d a b l e  l i a b i l i t y  
i n s u r a n c e ,  t h e y  c l a i m ,  t h e  t h r e a t  of  l a w s u i t s  may make i t  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  
them t o  d e l i v e r  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s  and s e r v i c e s .  The i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  
c o n t e n d s  t h a t  a  l i t i g a t i o n  e x p l o s i o n  -- an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number of t o r t  
s u i t s  b rough t  and i n  t h e  s i z e  of damage awards -- i s  t h e  p r imary  c a u s e  o f  
t h e  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s .  T r i a l  l awyer s  and consumer g r o u p s ,  i n  
c o n t r a s t ,  d i s p u t e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a l i t i g a t i o n  e x p l o s i o n  and p l a c e  t h e  
blame f o r  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s  on economic problems caused  by t h e  i n s u r e r s  
t hemse lves .  
BACKGROUND AND AHALYSI S 
Economic F a c t o r s  
With premiums f o r  b u s i n e s s  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  s o a r i n g  and c o v e r a g e  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  f o r  many l i n e s  of  b u s i n e s s ,  t h e  commercial  i n s u r a n c e  
i n d u s t r y  h a s  been d e s c r i b e d  by many o b s e r v e r s  a s  i n  c r i s i s .  T h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  h a s  p l aced  s e v e r e  economic p r e s s u r e s  on a  wide v a r i e t y  o f  
b u s i n e s s e s ,  p r o f e s s i p n a l s ,  a n d  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  p r o d u c t s  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  h e a l t h  c a r e  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  long-haul  t r u c k i n g ,  c o r p o r a t e  
o f f i c e r s  and d i r e c t o r s ,  c h i l d  c a r e  f a c i l i t i e s ,  commercial f i s h i n g  v e s s e l s ,  
and o t h e r s .  I t  h a s  g i v e n  r i s e  t o  a  n a t i o n a l  d e b a t e  o v e r  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  
i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y ,  i t s  r o l e  i n  t h e  economy, and t h e  p r o p e r  r o l e  of  t h e  
F e d e r a l  Government i n  o v e r s e e i n g  and r e g u l a t i n g  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  
C u r r e n t  i n s u r a n c e  problems i n v o l v i n g  h i g h  premium rates and l i m i t e d  
amounts  o f  a v a i l a b l e  cove rage  s tem i n  l a r g e  p a r t  f rom s u b s t a n t i a l  l o s s e s  
s u f f e r e d  by i n s u r e r s .  The American p r o p e r t y - c a s u a l t y  i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  
and t h e  L loyd ' s  of London u n d e r w r i t e r s ,  who have p rov ided  a  p r i n c i p a l  
r e i n s u r a n c e  marke t  by s p r e a d i n g  r i s k s  on a  worldwide b a s i s ,  s u f f e r e d  
r e c o r d  u n d e r w r i t i n g  l o s s e s  i n  1984  and  1 9 8 5 .  T h e  d o m e s t i c  
p r o p e r t y - c a s u a l t y  i n d u s t r y  r e p o r t e d  o p e r a t i n g  l o s s e s  ( a  combina t ion  o f  
u n d e r w r i t i n g  r e s u l t s  and inves tmen t  income, b e f o r e  payment o f  t a x e s )  o f  
$3.8 b i l l i o n  i n  1984,  and $5.4 b i l l i o n  i n  1985. The d e f i c i t  was 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  narrowed,  however, by t a x  c r e d i t s  and c a p i t a l  g a i n s  on s a l e s  
of i nves tmen t  s e c u r i t i e s .  Seve re  u n d e r w r i t i n g  l o s s e s  sh runk  i n s u r a n c e  
c a p a c i t y ,  which i s  t h e  amount of  working c a p i t a l  on hand,  and which 
d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  volume o f  b u s i n e s s  a n  i n s u r e r  can  l e g a l l y  w r i t e .  Va ry ing  
d e g r e e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  impairment  among p r o p e r t y - c a s u a l t y  companies h a v e  
been wide ly  r e p o r t e d ,  and S t a t e  r e g u l a t o r y  o f f i c i a l s  r e p o r t  t h a t  i n s u r e r  
i n s o l v e n c i e s  a r e  runn ing  a t  l e v e l s  unprecedented  i n  t h e  modern h i s t o r y  o f  
t h e  i n d u s t r y .  
The i n s u r a n c e  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  
comnerc i a l  l i a b i l i t y  cove rages .  Commercial p r o p e r t y  c o v e r a g e  h a s  a l s o  
been a f f e c t e d ,  b u t  t o  a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t ;  p e r s o n a l  l i n e s  c o v e r a g e s  c o n t i n u e  
t o  be w r i t t e n  i n  a  g e n e r a l l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  envi ronment ,  w i t h  l i m i t e d  p r i c e  
and supp ly  problems.  Although commercial L i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  a c c o u n t s  
o n l y  f o r  rough1 y  10% of t o t a l  p rope r ty -casua l  t y  b u s i n e s s  o p e r a t  i o n s ,  t h i s  
t y p e  o f  cove rage  h a s  been demons t r a t ed  t o  be  v i t a l  t o  t h e  economy. The 
s e v e r e  u n d e r w r i t i n g  l o s s e s  f o r  commercial l i a b i l i t y  have  had a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
impact  on i n s u r e r s '  f i n a n c i a l  per formance  and subsequen t  u n d e r w r i t i n g  and  
p r i c i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  
The c a u s e s  of t h e  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s  a r e  many. The i n a b i l i t y  
of  i n s u r e r s  t o  p r i c e  premiums when t h e y  canno t  d e f i n e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  r i s k  
i s  s a i d  t o  be of major  impor tance .  The i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  c o n t e n d s  t h a t  
r e a l i s t i c  u n d e r w r i t i n g  ( r i s k  a s se s smen t  and p r i c i n g )  f o r  c o m n e r c i a l  
l i a b i l i t y  r i s k s  i s  p r o b l e m a t i c  l a r g e l y  because  of c a s e  law deve lopmen t s  
( a s  opposed t o  s t a t u t o r y  changes )  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  t o r t  l i t i g a t i o n  and 
because  o f  t h e  e x t e n t  of monetary damages awarded. T o r t  l aw d e t e r m i n e s  
who i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  and what damages s h a l l  b e  p a i d  when i n j u r i e s  are 
c l a imed .  Cost  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  engendered  by t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m  h a v e ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y ,  made t r u e  l i a b i l i t y  c o s t s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  c a l c u l a t e  o r  p r o j e c t  when i n s u r e r s  cannot  measure o r  p r e d i c t  what 
d e g r e e  of  l i a b i l i t y  t h e y  may f a c e  i n  f u t u r e  y e a r s .  T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t h e  c a s e  f o r  r i s k  exposu re  t h a t  may n o t  now be a p p a r e n t  and f o r  which  t h e  
c o u r t s  may e v e n t u a l l y  ho ld  i n s u r e r s  l i a b l e .  
The i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  h a s  been accused  o f  blaming t h e  t o r t  s y s t e m  
f o r  i t s  problems i n  o r d e r  t o  d i v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  from t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  own poor  
management r e c o r d .  P r o p e r t y - c a s u a l t y  companies i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  p r i c e d  
t h e i r  p o l i c i e s  f a r  b e l o w  c o s t  t o  a t t r a c t  f u n d s  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t .  
T h e n - p r e v a i l i n g  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  on i n v e s t m e n t s  compensated f o r  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  premiums. Now t h a t  i n t e r e s , t  r a t e s  have dropped t o  t h e  p o i n t  
where i nves tmen t  r e t u r n s  a r e  n o t  a b l e  t o  c o v e r  growing u n d e r w r i t i n g  
l o s s e s ,  i n d u s t r y  c r i t i c s  a r g u e ,  i n s u r e r s  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  r e c o u p  l o s s e s  t o o  
q u i c k 1  y  w i t h  u n r e a s o n a b l e  r a t e  i n c r e a s e s  and a r e  s e e k i n g  government  
p r o t e c t i o n  th rough  t o r t  law reform.  I n d u s t r y  c r i t i c s  a r e  a l s o  conce rned  
t h a t  much economic d a t a  on t h e  i n d u s t r y  can  come o n l y  from i n d u s t r y  
s o u r c e s  and have e x p r e s s e d  d i s c o n t e n t  conce rn ing  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  i n d u s t r y  
c o n t r o l  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  i n d u s t r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  S e v e r a l  
i n s u r a n c e  d a t a  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  b i l l s  were i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  9 9 t h  
Congress  b u t  d i d  n o t  advance.  
I n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  i n s u r a n c e  h a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been r e g u l a t e d  a t  
t h e  S t a t e  l e v e l ,  w i t h  l i m i t e d  F e d e r a l  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  adequacy  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  s u c h  r e g u l a t i o n .  Consequent ly ,  i n s u r a n c e  problems are 
now a n  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  f o r  S t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and o f f i c i a l s  and much 
r e m e d i a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  i n  p r o g r e s s .  But because  o f  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  
i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s  and because  i n s u r a n c e  problems a r e  n a t i o n a l  i n  s cope ,  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  and s c r u t i n y  have grown a c c o r d i n g l y .  The re  a p p e a r s  
t o  b e  i n c r e a s e d  p u b l i c  awareness  t h a t  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  i s  a n  e s s e n t i a l  
f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e  and mounting conce rn  t h a t  t h e  market  f o r  t h i s  i n s u r a n c e  
l a c k s  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d e g r e e  of s t a b i l i t y .  The p e r i o d i c  "boom-and-bust" 
m a r k e t  c y c l e s  t h a t  t y p i c a l l y  and h i s t o r i c a l l y  have  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
p r o p e r t y - c a s u a l t y  i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  o p e r a t i o n s  have been shown t o  be  
s e r i o u s l y  d i s r u p t i v e  t o  t h e  economy. During t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  f o c u s  on 
i n s u r a n c e  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  9 9 t h  Congress ,  some e x p r e s s e d  t h e  v i ew  t h a t  
i n s u r a n c e - r e l a t e d  problems shou ld  be a d d r e s s e d  on a  n a t i o n a l  s c a l e ,  and 
t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  b u s i n e s s  community, r e q u i r e s  t h e  
ma in t enance  of a n  o r d e r l y  and r e l i a b l e  i n s u r a n c e  mechanism. 
Legal  F a c t o r s  
Al though i n s u r e r s  blame t h e  i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s  l a r g e l y  on a  l i t i g a t i o n  
e x p l o s i o n ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  consumers and t r i a l  l awyer s  d i s p u t e  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  of s u c h  an e x p l o s i o n  and contend  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t o r t  sy s t em i s  
n e c e s s a r y  b o t h  t o  compensate i n j u r e d  p a r t i e s  and t o  f u r n i s h  a n  i n c e n t i v e  
f o r  p o t e n t i a l l y  l i a b l e  p a r t i e s  t o  engage i n  s a f e r  conduc t ,  s u c h  as 
manufac tu r ing  s a f e r  p r o d u c t s  and p r o v i d i n g  more c a r e f u l  medica l  t r e a t m e n t .  
The re  a r e  r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  on b o t h  s i d e s  of t h e  i s s u e  o f  whe the r  t h e r e  
h a s  been a  l i t i g a t i o n  e x p l o s i o n .  To c i t e  j u s t  a  few, t h e  T o r t  P o l i c y  
Working Group, e s t a b l i s h e d  by At to rney  Genera l  Meese, concluded  t h a t  t h e r e  
h a s  been a n  " e x p l o s i v e  growth i n  t o r t  damages awards  o v e r  t h e  l a s t  
decade." The Consumer F e d e r a t i o n  of America, i n  c o n t r a s t ,  conc luded  " t h a t  
awards have  n o t  grown o u t  of  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  s o c i a l  and economic changes , "  
such  a s  i n f l a t i o n ,  r e a l  income growth ,  l i f e  expec t ancy ,  and med ica l  c o s t s ,  
a l l  of which a f f e c t  t h e  s i z e  o f  damage awards.  The Rand C o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  C i v i l  J u s t i c e  concluded  - t h a t ,  i n  most c a s e s ,  c i v i l  j u r y  
I I v e r d i c t s  have  remained r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s t a n t  a t  a  modest l e v e l , "  b u t  t h a t  
I I l a r g e  awards a r e  i n c r e a s i n g  r a p i d l y . "  Although t h e  l a t t e r  g r o u p  
I I c o n s t i t u t e s  a  s m a l l  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  number of  c a s e s ,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
l i o n ' s  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  d o l l a r s  awarded a t  t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t  l e v e l . "  
T o r t  law i s  p r i m a r i l y  S t a t e  law, bu t  i n s u r e r s  have  been u r g i n g  b o t h  
Congress  and t h e  S t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  t o  e n a c t  t o r t  re form.  Congres s  
a p p a r e n t l y  would have  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  power t o  preempt S t a t e  t o r t  law.  
P roponen t s  of t o r t  r e fo rm g e n e r a l l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e f o r m s ,  among 
o t h e r s  : 
P l a c e  Caps o n  Damages f o r  P a i n  and S u f f e r i n g  
I t  h a s  been proposed t h a t  c e i l i n g s  be p l aced  on t h e  amount 
r e c o v e r a b l e  i n  damages f o r  p a i n  and s u f f e r i n g ,  which i s  o r d i n a r i l y  s e t  by 
t h e  j u r y .  Some p r o p o s a l s  c a l l  f o r  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  c a p s ,  some f o r  c a p s  
a p p l i c a b l e  o n l y  when t h e  p l a i n t i f f  i s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  s e t t l e  h i s  c a s e ,  and  
o t h e r s  f o r  compensat ion schemes g i v i n g  p l a i n t i f f s  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  n o - f a u l t  
r e c o v e r y  i f  t h e y  a g r e e  t o  caps .  S e v e r a l  S t a t e s  have e n a c t e d  c a p s  on 
non-economic damages, some a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  t o r t  s u i t s  and some o n l y  t o  
s p e c i f i c  t y p e s ,  such  a s  medica l  m a l p r a c t i c e .  P roponen t s  o f  c a p s  on p a i n  
a n d  s u f f e r i n g  a r g u e  t h a t  u n l i m i t e d  j u r y  d i s c r e t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  
u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  f o r  i n s u r e r s ;  opponents  a r g u e  t h a t  c a p s  pun i sh  o n l y  t h e  
most s e v e r e l y  a f f l i c t e d  t o r t  v i c t i m s .  
P l a c e  R e s t r i c t i o n s  on  P u n i t i v e  Damages 
P u n i t i v e  damages a r e  damages des igned  t o  pun i sh  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  f o r  
o u t r a g e o u s  conduct  -- i n t e n t i o n a l  o r  r e c k l e s s  d i s r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  s a f e t y  o f  
o t h e r s  t h a t  goes  beyond n e g l i g e n c e .  P u n i t i v e  damages c o n s t i t u t e  a n  award 
f o r  t h e  p l a i n t i f f  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  damages t o  compensate him f o r  h i s  
i n j u r i e s .  Among t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  sugges t ed  f o r  p u n i t i v e  damages a r e  t h a t  
t h e y  b e  p r o h i b i t e d ,  t h a t  c a p s  be p l a c e d  on them, t h a t  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  
which  t h e y  may be  awarded be more nar rowly  d e f i n e d ,  t h a t  t h e  p l a i n t i f f  b e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  prove  by " c l e a r  and convinc ing"  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  h e  i s  e n t i t l e d  
t o  them ( i n s t e a d  of be ing  h e l d  o n l y  t o  t h e  u s u a l  "preponderance" of t h e  
e v i d e n c e  s t a n d a r d ) ,  t h a t  t h e  number of p l a i n t i f f s  e n t i t l e d  t o  p u n i t i v e  
damages f o r  t h e  same wrong be l i m i t e d ,  and t h a t  p u n i t i v e  damages b e  p a i d  
t o  t h e  government o r  t o  a  fund r a t h e r  t han  t o  t h e  p l a i n t i f f .  Advocates  of 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p u n i t i v e  damages c l a i m  t h a t  t h e i r  amounts have e s c a l a t e d  
t o  a s t r o n o m i c a l  f i g u r e s .  Opponents c l a i m  t h a t  t h e y  p r o t e c t  p u b l i c  s a f e t y  
and a r g u e  t h a t  t h e y  should  be made u n i n s u r a b l e  s o  t h e y  w i l l  be more 
e f f e c t i v e  d e t e r r e n t s  o f  i n e x c u s a b l e  conduct .  
E l i m i n a t e  J o i n t  and  S e v e r a l  L i a b i l i t y  
I n  most S t a t e s ,  i f  two o r  more d e f e n d a n t s  a r e  p a r t i a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t h e  same a c c i d e n t ,  t h e y  a r e  both  h e l d  100% l i a b l e ,  and t h e  p l a i n t i f f  
may choose  t h e  one from whom t o  c o l l e c t  h i s  damages. A d e f e n d a n t  who pays 
more t h a n  h i s  p r o p o r t i o n a t e  s h a r e  of t h e  judgment i s  u s u a l l y  p e r m i t t e d  t o  
r e c o v e r  from o t h e r  l i a b l e  d e f e n d a n t s ,  but  such o t h e r  d e f e n d a n t s  may n o t  
have money. J o i n t  and s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  h e l p s  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  v i c t i m  o f  an  
a c c i d e n t  w i l l  r e c o v e r  f u l l y ,  b u t  i t  r e s u l t s  i n  some d e f e n d a n t s  pay ing  f o r  
more t h a n  t h e i r  s h a r e  of t h e  judgment. I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  n e a r l y  h a l f  t h e  
S t a t e s  have  a b o l i s h e d  o r  modif ied  t h e i r  j o i n t  and s e v e r a l  l i a b i l i t y  l a w s ,  
i n  some c a s e s  making them a p p l i c a b l e  o n l y  t o  economic damages. 
E l i m i n a t e  t h e  C o l l a t e r a l  Source  Rule 
T h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  r u l e  p r o h i b i t s  d e d u c t i n g  f rom a p l a i n t i f f ' s  damages 
any compensat ion h e  r e c e i v e s  from a  s o u r c e ,  such a s  h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e ,  
o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  de fendan t .  The b a s i s  f o r  t h e  r u l e  i s  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  
v i c t i m  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  wrongdoer should  prof  i t  from t h e  v i c t i m ' s  p rudence  
( i n  buying h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e )  o r  good f o r t u n e  ( i n  hav ing  some o t h e r  
c o l l a t e r a l  s o u r c e  a v a i l a b l e ) .  E l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  c o l l a t e r a l  s o u r c e  r u l e  
might  a l s o  r e d u c e  t h e  d e t e r r e n t  e f f e c t  o f  t o r t  s u i t s .  On t h e  o t h e r  s i d e ,  
damages awarded t h a t  d u p l i c a t e  c o l l a t e r a l  sou rce  payments may be viewed as 
a w i n d f a l l  f o r  t h e  p l a i n t i f f .  
L i m i t  Lawyers' Cont ingency Fees  
A con t ingency  f e e  i s  one i n  which a  lawyer a g r e e s ,  i n  exchange f o r  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  a  c l i e n t ,  t o  a c c e p t  a  p e r c e n t a g e  of t h e  r e c o v e r y  i n  t h e  e v e n t  
of  a  s u c c e s s f u l  p r o s e c u t i o n  of t h e  a c t i o n .  Such p e r c e n t a g e  f r e q u e n t l y  
amounts t o  more t h a n  t h e  a t t o r n e y  would e a r n  i f  he cha rged  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  
h o u r l y  r a t e s  f o r  h i s  s e r v i c e s ;  t h e  l a w y e r ' s  e n t i t l e m e n t  t o  t h i s  g r e a t e r  
f e e  g e n e r a l l y  i s  j u s t i f i e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  r i s k  he  t a k e s  o f  e a r n i n g  
l e s s  t h a n  p r e v a i l i n g  r a t e s  i n  some c a s e s  and o f  e a r n i n g  n o t h i n g  f o r  h i s  
t ime i n  t h e  e v e n t  he l o s e s  t h e  c a s e .  Because con t ingency  f e e s  a r e  d e r i v e d  
e x c l u s i v e l y  from a  c l i e n t ' s  winnings ,  t h e y  e n a b l e  i n j u r e d  p e r s o n s  who 
o t h e r w i s e  cou ld  n o t  a f f o r d  t o  h i r e  a  lawyer  t o  do  so .  
Those who would l i m i t  con t ingency  f e e s  a r g u e  t h a t  a t  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  
l e v e l s  t h e y  prompt l awyer s  t o  t a k e  non m e r i t o r i o u s  c a s e s  and prompt j u r i e s  
t o  i n f l a t e  v e r d i c t s  t o  compensate p l a i n t i f f s  who j u r i e s  know w i l l  have t o  
pay  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p e r c e n t a g e  of  t h e i r  r ecove ry  t o  t h e i r  l awyer s .  
Opponents  of l i m i t s  on c o n t i n g e n t  f e e s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e y  d e t e r  l awyer s  from 
t a k i n g  non m e r i t o r i o u s  c a s e s  because  t h e  lawyer  g e t s  no  f e e  i f  h e  does  n o t  
win. They a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  i t  i s  d e f e n d a n t s '  l awyers  who, because  t h e y  work 
on a n  h o u r l y  o r  a s a l a r i e d  b a s i s ,  have a n  i n c e n t i v e  n o t  t o  s e t t l e  c l a i m s .  
R e q u i r e  P e r i o d i c  Payments o f  F u t u r e  Damages 
P l a i n t i f f s  i n  t o r t  c a s e s  a r e  o f t e n  awarded f u t u r e  damages -- damages 
f o r  f u t u r e  med ica l  c a r e ,  l o s s  o f  employment, p a i n  and s u f f e r i n g ,  and t h e  
l i k e .  T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  u n l e s s  t h e  p a r t i e s  a g r e e  o t h e r w i s e ,  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  
must pay a l l  f u t u r e  damages i n  one  lump-sum payment. R e q u i r i n g  p e r i o d i c  
payments would a i d  d e f e n d a n t s  because  t h e y  cou ld  pu rchase  an  a n n u i t y  
r a t h e r  t h a n  pay ing  a  l a r g e  sum a t  once. I t  would, however, d e c r e a s e  a 
p l a i n t i f f ' s  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  managing h i s  award,  Some p r o p o s a l s  would b e  
d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s  f o r  p l a i n t i f f s  because  a l l  o r  a  p o r t i o n  o f  p e r i o d i c  
payments would t e r m i n a t e  upon t h e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  dea th .  
McCarran-Ferguson Act  
Some s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s  would be e a s e d  by an  i n c r e a s e d  
F e d e r a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o r  o v e r s i g h t  of t h e  i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y .  
F e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n  i s  now l a r g e l y  p rec luded  by t h e  McCarran-Ferguson A c t ,  
which Congress  e n a c t e d  i n  1945. The McCarran-Ferguson Act e x p r e s s e s  t h e  
v iew of Congress  " t h a t  t h e  con t inued  r e g u l a t i o n  and t a x a t i o n  by t h e  
s e v e r a l  S t a t e s  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  of i n s u r a n c e  i s  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t . "  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  Act p r o v i d e s  t h a t  no F e d e r a l  s t a t u t e  s h a l l  preempt a  
S t a t e  s t a t u t e  t h a t  r e g u l a t e s  o r  t a x e s  t h e  b u s i n e s s  of  i n s u r a n c e ,  u n l e s s  
t h e  F e d e r a l  s t a t u t e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e l a t e s  t o  i n s u r a n c e ;  and t h a t  F e d e r a l  
a n t i t r u s t  l aw ( t h e  Sherman Ac t ,  t h e  C lay ton  Act ,  and t h e  F e d e r a l  T r a d e  
Comnission A c t )  s h a l l  n o t  a p p l y  t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s  of i n s u r a n c e  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  such  b u s i n e s s  i s  r e g u l a t e d  by S t a t e  law. A l l  S t a t e s  r e g u l a t e  t h e  
b u s i n e s s  o f  i n s u r a n c e ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n s u r a n c e  companies a r e  p e r m i t t e d  t o  
engage  i n  some c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t ,  i f  engaged i n  by o t h e r  
i n d u s t r i e s ,  would v i o l a t e  F e d e r a l  a n t i t r u s t  law. (An e x c e p t i o n  i n  t h e  
McCarran-Ferguson Act makes t h e  b u s i n e s s  of  i n su rance -  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
Sherman Act t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h e  Sherman Act p r o s c r i b e s  b o y c o t t s ,  c o e r c i o n ,  
and i n t i m i d a t i o n . )  
Congress  may c o n s i d e r  r e p e a l i n g  t h e  McCarran-Ferguson Act t o  make t h e  
b u s i n e s s  of i n s u r a n c e  s u b j e c t  t o  F e d e r a l  a n t i t r u s t  law and o t h e r  F e d e r a l  
r e g u l a t i o n ,  o r  modi fy ing  t h e  Act t o  a l t e r  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  
exempt ion  o r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  some form of o v e r s i g h t  o v e r  t h e  adequacy  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  S t a t e  i n s u r a n c e  r e g u l a t i o n .  A s  t h e  c o u r t s  h a v e  
i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  Act ,  any  r e g u l a t i o n  of t h e  b u s i n e s s  of i n s u r a n c e  by a  
S t a t e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of i t s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  make F e d e r a l  
a n t i t r u s t  law i n a p p l i c a b l e  t o  such  b u s i n e s s .  
The Uni ted  S t a t e s  i s  a t y p i c a l  among n a t i o n s  i n  n o t  s u p e r v i s i n g  i t s  
i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  The U.S. sys t em o f  i n s u r a n c e  
r e g u l a t i o n  may p u z z l e  f o r e i g n  o b s e r v e r s  who c o n s i d e r  t h e  f r e e  movement o f  
t r a d e  and comnerc i a l  s e r v i c e s  t o  be  one of t h e  prime r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of  a  
c e n t r a l  government ,  and t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of un i form l e g a l  r u l e s  f o r  l a r g e  
s c a l e  b u s i n e s s  o p e r a t i o n s  t o  be  an  e s s e n t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h a t  f r e e  
movement. I n s u r a n c e  i s  t h e  o n l y  l a r g e - s c a l e  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r  n o t  
d i r e c t l y  r e g u l a t e d  a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  l e v e l .  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  have a l s o  been 
r a i s e d  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  con t inued  e f f i c a c y  o f  S t a t e  i n s u r a n c e  r e g u l a t i o n ,  
g i v e n  t h e  r a p i d l y  e v o l v i n g  developments  i n  f i n a n c i a l  marke t  r e s t r u c t u r i n g .  
The q u a l i t y  of  S t a t e  i n s u r a n c e  r e g u l a t i o n  h a s  been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  a s  
uneven,  and t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  of i n t e r s t a t e  r e g u l a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s  c a n  b e  
p r o b l e m a t i c .  C r i t i c s  of  S t a t e  r e g u l a t i v e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  emphas ize  t h e  
d i s a d v a n t a g e s  of non- u n i f o r m i t y  t h a t  r e s u l t  f rom a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  S t a t e  
i n s u r a n c e  codes  and t h e  d u p l i c a t i o n  and i n e f f i c i e n c y  t h i s  engende r s .  Some 
c r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  of  i n s u r a n c e  shou ld  be s u b j e c t  t o  F e d e r a l  
a n t i t r u s t  law t o  t h e  same e x t e n t  a s  o t h e r  b u s i n e s s e s .  I n  d e f e n d i n g  t h e i r  
F e d e r a l  a n t i t r u s t  immunity, t h e  i n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  h a s  l o n g  m a i n t a i n e d  
t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  i n s u r e r s  t o  per form c e r t a i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  p o o l i n g  of  l o s s  d a t a ,  i n  o r d e r  a c c u r a t e l y  t o  
p r o j e c t  f u t u r e  l o s s  p o t e n t i a l  and ,  t h e r e b y ,  a d e q u a t e l y  p r i c e  i n s u r a n c e  
cove rages .  I n s u r e r s  have  h i s t o r i c a l l y  ma in t a ined  t h a t  c o n t i n u e d  exempt ion  
from F e d e r a l  a n t i t r u s t  l aws  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  conduct  of t h e i r  b u s i n e s s .  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e y  a r g u e ,  t h e  i n d u s t r y  remains  i n t e n s e l y  c o m p e t i t i v e ,  t o  t h e  
b e n e f i t  of t h e  p u b l i c .  
Opponents  o f  F e d e r a l  i n s u r a n c e  r e fo rm i n i t i a t i v e s  h a v e  l o n g  and  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  opposed changes  t o  a l l o w  i n c r e a s e d  F e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n  o r  
o v e r s i g h t .  They have  contended  t h a t  a  F e d e r a l  r o l e  i s  n o t  j u s t i f i e d  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  a n  i n d u s t r y  whose per formance ,  by any  measure ,  i n c l u d i n g  s o c i a l  
b e n e f i t ,  h a s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  matched o r  exceeded  most f e d e r a l l y  r e g u l a t e d  
i n d u s t r i e s .  The S t a t e  r e g u l a t o r y  sys t em o f f e r s ,  i n  t h i s  v iew,  t h e  
f l e x i b i l i t y  n e e d e d  f o r  c r e a t i v e  r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  t o  v a r y i n g  marke t  
c o n d i t i o n s  and p r o v i d e s  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  cove rage  p r i c e  
and s u p p l y .  I n s u r a n c e  i n d u s t r y  spokesmen now g e n e r a l l y  concede  t h a t  a 
problem e x i s t s ,  b u t  warn a g a i n s t  o v e r r e a c t i o n  t h a t  may i n j u r e  t h e  
i n d u s t r y ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  per form r e s p o n s i v e l y  and c r e a t i v e l y ,  and n o t e  t h e  
e a s i n g  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  c r i s i s  due t o  r e s p o n s i v e  workings  of t h e  marke t .  
LEG1 SLATION 
The 9 9 t h  Congress  c o n s i d e r e d  many b i l l s  d e s i g n e d  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  
l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s  and t o r t  re form.  I t  e n a c t e d  one  s t a t u t e  
d e s i g n e d  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  c r i s i s  g e n e r a l l y ,  and one  aimed a t  a  
s p e c i f i c  a r e a  -- v a c c i n e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s '  l i a b i l i t y .  The fo rmer  s t a t u t e  was 
t h e  R i s k  R e t e n t i o n  Amendments of 1986,  P.L. 99-563, which amended t h e  
P roduc t  L i a b i l i t y  R i sk  R e t e n t i o n  Act of 1981. The 1981 law was i n t e n d e d  
t o  p e r m i t  p roduc t  m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  s e l l e r s ,  and d i s t r i b u t o r s  t o  p u r c h a s e  
i n s u r a n c e  on  a  g roup  b a s i s  o r  t o  s e l f  i n s u r e  t h r o u g h  i n s u r a n c e  
c o o p e r a t i v e s  c a l l e d  " r i s k  r e t e n t i o n  groups." The 1986 law expanded t h e  
s cope  of  t h e  1981 l a w  t o  e n a b l e  r i s k  r e t e n t i o n  and p u r c h a s i n g  g r o u p s  t o  
p r o v i d e  n o t  o n l y  p roduc t  l i a b i l i t y  i n s u r a n c e ,  b u t  a l l  t y p e s  o f  l i a b i l i t y  
i n s u r a n c e .  
The Childhood Vaccine I n j u r y  Act of 1986, P.L. 99-660, r e q u i r e s  most  
p e r s o n s  s u f f e r i n g  v a c c i n e - r e l a t e d  i n j u r i e s ,  p r i o r  t o  f i l i n g  a  t o r t  a c t i o n ,  
t o  s e e k  n o - f a u l t  compensat ion through a  compensat ion program e s t a b l i s h e d  
by t h e  Act .  Under t h e  program, compensat ion f o r  p a i n  and s u f f e r i n g  would 
be l i m i t e d  t o  $250,000. A p a r t y  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e  compensa t ion  
awarded unde r  t h e  program cou ld  f i l e  a  t o r t  a c t i o n  unde r  S t a t e  l a w ,  b u t  
s u b j e c t  t o  some l i m i t a t i o n s .  A t  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  s t a t u t e  l a c k s  a method f o r  
financing the compensation program; it will be up to the 100th Congress to 
determine how to fund the program. 
In the 100th Congress, Senator Metzenbaum has introduced S. 80, a 
bill to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. Following a lengthy 
hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Feb. 18, 1987, it has 
been reported that revisions to the bill may be considered that would 
modify only the antitrust provision of the Act. The hearing exhibited an 
unusual combination of Administration officials and liberal Comnittee 
Democrats in agreement on the desirability of reforming the antitrust law 
exemption for insurance businesses. Other McCarran-Ferguson modifications 
or repeal measures are expected to be introduced later in the first 
session of the 100th Congress. 
Tort reform bills pending in the 100th Congress are listed in CRS 
Issue Brief 77021. 
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